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Abstract. This article provides a hypothetical damage assessment based on the assumption that Dr. Max 
Eitingon, a significant early member of the international psychoanalytic movement, was also a Soviet 
intelligence operative. 
 
After the 1988 publication of John Dziak's Chekisty: A history of the KGB, a controversy erupted as to 
whether Max Eitingon, a significant early member of the international psychoanalytic movement, may 
also have been a member of a Soviet secret police network and aided in the 1937 (1) assassination of 
Ignace Reiss, a defector from the Soviet secret police; (2) kidnapping of Yevgeni Karlovich Miller, a White 
Russian general, from the streets of Paris; and (3) secret trial that resulted in the executions of--among 
others--the Soviet chief army commissar and eight generals. Although Dziak's book presents, at most, 
circumspect inference to the above, other writings--viz., that of Stephen Schwartz (1988)--were frankly 
sensational. Then again, suspicion as to Eitingon's relationship with the Soviet secret police was nothing 
new. According to Robert Conquest (1988), it had been discussed at least since 1938. 
 
The public controversy stemming from Dziak's book--and, more strongly, Schwartz's article--played itself 
out in the pages of the The New York Times Book Review and in two articles (April 14 and June 16, 1988) 
by Theodore Draper in The New York Review of Books. The main points of contention centered on (1) 
the presence, absence, and/or degree of familial relationship between Max Eitingon and Leonid 
Eitingon, a high-level, Soviet secret service operative often credited with the key planning role in the 
assassination of Leon Trotsky; (2) how a stellar member of a stellar intellectual movement could possibly 
be involved in such unsavory doings; and (3) the criteria for evidence of innocence and guilt. 
 
The present article posits that a relationship between Max Eitingon and the Soviet secret police--even 
one independent of directly supporting kidnapping, assassination, and execution--might well have had 
significant intelligence collection benefits to the Soviets. 
 
Eitingon had a very close and trusting relationship with Sigmund Freud according Freud's biographer and 
chronicler of the psychoanalytic movement, Ernest Jones (1955). From Jones, we learn that Freud wrote 
Eitingon a letter in 1913 including the sentence: "You were the first to reach the lonely one and will be 
the last to leave" (p. 32). Also, "he [Eitingon] was of invaluable material assistance to Freud's 
undertakings…." (p. 161) and "Freud could be confident in retaining his [Eitingon's] friendship in any 
circumstances" (p. 161). An inference needing rigorous exploration would be that Freud was ripe for 
cultivation at some point as an unwitting agent of influence or source of information. As far back as 
before the establishment of the Soviet Union, Freud was already providing opinions on political and 
military conflict to Eitingon (pp. 187-188). In a different vein, the intellectual movements attempting to 
integrate psychoanalysis with Marxism later enjoyed quite a vogue at elite universities. And cultivation 
of prominent individuals with or without important technical knowledge constituted a significant Soviet 
effort. As a contrast to the possibility with Freud, note Margarita Konenkova's relationship with Albert 
Einstein (Pogrebin, 1998). 
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More importantly, the very essence of psychoanalytic therapy is to induce patients and training analysts 
to say whatever comes into their heads--attempting as well as possible to evade self-censorship--while 
the analyst takes notes. What amazing intelligence collection potential! And Dr. Eitingon's intelligence 
role could have been much more significant than just a single analyst collecting on those who lay on the 
couch. As a member of the Wednesday Evening Society, the forerunner of the Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society, he was part of one of the earliest nuclei of those who determined how therapy was to be 
implemented. He was later elected and twice reelected to the presidency of the International 
Psychoanalytic Society and also headed the International Training Commission. Even if--as others have 
reported--he was not a significant contributor to the growing psychoanalytic body of knowledge, he, 
perhaps more than anyone else, was responsible for the creation of training institutes throughout the 
world and the selection criteria for analysts. Eitingon--in all probability--had a tremendous amount to do 
with where institutes would be placed, which would be sanctioned, and who could become analysts 
with the politically correct Freudian imprimatur. The potential for an international network of 
intelligence collection and transmission speaks for itself. (As but one example, high-level military 
medical authorities from Austria, Hungary, and Germany became interested as far back as 1918 in 
setting up psychoanalytic clinics to treat so-called war neuroses (p. 198).) 
 
Dr. Eitingon's motivation? Far be it from IBPP to venture forth with psychosexual premise. It may suffice 
to posit his own socialist foundations of Zionism that certainly predated his own move to Palestine, as 
well as the supporting and tortuous self-psychological machinations so well described by Koestler in 
Darkness a Noon. IBPP encourages scholars to follow congruent lines of investigation. (See Conquest, R. 
(July 3, 1988). Max Eitingon: Another view. The New York Times Book Review, p. 22; Dziak, J.J. (1988). 
Chekisty: A history of the KGB. D.C. Heath & Co.; Gay, P. (March 6, 1988). Stalin's killerati. The New York 
Times Book Review, p. 2; Jones, E. (1955). The life and work of Sigmund Freud Vol. 2. NY: Basic Books; 
Koestler, A. (1941). Darkness at noon. Macmillan; Max Eitingon: Further views. (September 11, 1988). 
The New York Times Book Review, p. 37; Pogrebin, R. (June 1, 1998). Love letters by Einstein at auction. 
The New York Times, p. A10; Schwartz, S. (January 24, 1988). Intellectuals and assassins-Annals of 
Stalin's killerati. The New York Times Book Review, p. 3; Stalin's killerati. (March 6, 1988). The New York 
Times Book Review, p. 33.)(Keywords: Eitingon, Intelligence, Psychoanalysis, Soviet Union.) 
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